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Abstract: A non-antagonistic positional differential two-person game is considered in which
each of the two players, in addition to the usual normal (nor) type of behavior oriented toward
maximizing own functional, can use other types of behavior. In particular, it is altruistic (alt),
aggressive (agg) and paradoxical (par) types. It is assumed that in the course of the game
players can switch their behavior from one type to another. In this game, each player along
with the choice of positional strategy also chooses the indicator function defined over the whole
time interval of the game and taking values in the set {nor, alt, agg, par}. Player’s indicator
function shows the dynamics for changing the type of behavior that this player adheres to. The
concept of BT -solution for such game is introduced. Using players types of behavior other than
normal, can lead to outcomes more preferable to them than in a game with only a normal type
of behavior. An example of a game with the dynamics of simple motion in the plane and phase
constraints illustrates the procedure for constructing BT -solutions.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the present paper we consider a non-antagonistic positi-
onal differential two-person game (see, for example, Basar
and Olsder [1999], Petrosyan and Zenkevich [2012]), for
which emphasis is placed on the case where each of the two
players, in addition to the normal (nor), type of behavior
oriented on maximizing their own functional, can use other
types of behavior introduced in Kleimenov [1997], Klei-
menov and Kryazhimskii [1998], such as altruistic (alt),
aggressive (agg) and paradoxical (par) types. It is assumed
that during the game, players can switch their behavior
from one type to another. The idea of using the players
to switch their behavior from one type to another in the
course of the game was applied to the game with coopera-
tive dynamics in Kleimenov and Kryazhimskii [1998] and
for the repeated bimatrix 2× 2 game in Kleimenov [1999],
which allowed to obtain new solutions in these games.
It is also assumed that in the game each player chooses the
indicator function determined over the whole time interval
of the game and takes values in the set {nor, alt, agg, par},
along with the choice of the positional strategy. Player’s
indicator function shows the dynamics for changing the
type of behavior that this player adheres to. Rules for
the formation of controls are introduced for each pair of
behaviors of players.
The formalization of positional strategies in the game
is based on the formalization and results of the general
theory of antagonistic positional differential games Kra-
sovskii and Subbotin [1988], Krasovskii [1985]. For non-
antagonistic differential games this formalization was de-
veloped in Kleimenov [1993].
In the paper the concept of the BT -solution is introduced.
An example of a game with dynamics of simple motion
in the plane and phase constraints in two variants is
proposed. In the first variant we assume that the first
and second players can exhibit altruism towards their
partner for some time periods. In the second variant, in
addition to the assumption of altruism of the players, we
also assume that each player can act aggressively against
another player for some periods of time, and a case of
mutual aggression is allowed. In both variants sets of BT -
solutions are described. This paper is a continuation of
Kleimenov [1999], Kleimenov [2015], Kleimenov [2017].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
some results from the theory of non-antagonistic positional
differential games. Definitions of various types of behavior
for players are given in Section 3. The concept of the BT -
solution is introduced. Section 4 contains an example of
the game with dynamics of simple motions and with phase
constraints.
2. SOME RESULTS FROM THE THEORY OF
NON-ANTAGONISTIC POSITIONAL
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
2.1 Dynamics of the game.
Consider a two-person non-antagonistic positional diffe-
rential game (NPDG) which dynamics is described by the
following equation
ẋ = f(t, x, u, v), t ∈ [t0, ϑ], x(t0) = x0 (1)
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where x ∈ Rn is a phase vector; the controls u ∈ P ∈
compRp and v ∈ Q ∈ compRq are handled by Player 1
(P1) and Player 2 (P2), respectively.
Let G be a compact set in R1×Rn whose projection on the
time axis is equal to the given interval [t0, ϑ]. We assume,
that all the trajectories of system (1), beginning at an
arbitrary position (t∗, x∗) ∈ G, remain within G for all
t ∈ [t∗, ϑ].
Let the following assumptions be fulfilled.
10. The function f : G × P × Q → Rn is continuous over
the set of arguments.
20. The function f satisfies the Lipschitz condition with
respect to x.
30. There exists a constant λ > 0 such that
‖f(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤ λ(1 + ‖x‖)
for all (t, x) ∈ G, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q.









sT f(t, x, u, v)
for any s ∈ Rn and (t, x) ∈ G. Here and below the upper
symbol T denotes the operation of transposition.
2.2 Formalization of strategies and motions.
Assume that both players have information about the
current position of the game (t, x(t)). Then P1 and P2
acts in the class of pure positional strategies.
The formalization of players’ positional strategies and mo-
tions generated by them in a NPDG is based on the forma-
lization and results of antagonistic positional differential
games theory from the books Krasovskii [1985], Krasovskii
and Subbotin [1988]. The following presentation is given
in Kleimenov [1993].
Strategy of P1 is identified with the pair U = {u(t, x, ε),
β1(ε)}, where u(·) is an arbitrary function of position (t, x)
and a positive precision parameter ε > 0 and taking values
in the set P . The function β1 : (0,∞) −→ (0,∞) is
a continuous monotonic function satisfying the condition
β1(ε) → 0 if ε → 0. For a fixed ε the value β1(ε) is the
upper bound step of subdivision the segment [t0, ϑ], which
P1 applies when forming step-by-step motions.
Similarly, the strategy of P2 is defined as V = {v(t, x, ε),
β2(ε)}.
Motions of two types - approximated (step-by-step) and
ideal (limiting) are considered as motions generated by a
pair {strategy of P1 – strategy of P2}.
Approximated motion xε∆[·] = x[·, t0, x0, U, ε1,∆1, V,
ε2,∆2] generated by a pair of strategies (U, V ) from ini-
tial position (t0, x0) is introduced for fixed values of the
players’ precision parameters ε1 and ε2 and for fixed subdi-
visions ∆1 = {t(1)i } and ∆2 = {t
(2)
i } of the interval [t0, ϑ]
chosen by P1 and P2, respectively, under the conditions
δ(∆i) ≤ βi(εi), i = 1, 2 as step-by-step solution of the
differential equation





[t], vε2∆2 [t]), x
ε
∆[t0] = x0,






i ], ε1), t
(1)
i ≤ t < t
(1)
i+1,






j ], ε2), t
(2)




A limiting motion generated by the pair of strategies
(U, V ) from initial position (t0, x0) is a continuous function
x[t] = x[t, t0, x0, U, V ] for which there exists a sequence
of approximated motions {x[t, tk0 , xk0 , U, εk1 ,∆k1 , V, εk2 ,∆k2 ]},
uniformly converging to x(t) on [t0, ϑ] as k → ∞, εk1 →
0, εk2 → 0, tk0 → to, xk0 → xo.
A pair of strategies (U, V ) generates a nonempty compact
(in the metric of the space C[t0, ϑ]) set X(t0, x0, U, V )
consisting of limit motions x[·, t0, x0, U, V ].
The control laws (U, ε1,∆1) and (V, ε2,∆2) are said to be
agreed with respect to the precision parameter if ε1 = ε2.
Agreed control laws generate agreed approximate motions,
the sequences of which generate agreed limit motions.
2.3 Players’ payoff functionals
Player i chooses his control to maximize the payoff functi-
onal
Ii = σi(x[ϑ]), i = 1, 2 (3)
where σi : R
n → R1 are given continuous functions.
2.4 NE- and P (NE) -solutions in NPDG.
We introduce the following definitions from Kleimenov
[1993].
Definition 1. A pair of strategies (Ũ , Ṽ ) is called a Nash
equilibrium solution (NE–solution) of the game, if for any
motion x∗[·] ∈ X(t0, x0, Ũ , Ṽ ), any moment τ ∈ [t0, ϑ],




∗[τ ], U, Ṽ ]) ≤ min
x[·]
σ1(x[ϑ, τ, x




∗[τ ], Ũ , V ]) ≤ min
x[·]
σ2(x[ϑ, τ, x
∗[τ ], Ũ , Ṽ ]).
(4)
where the operations min are performed over a set of
agreed motions, and the operations max by sets of all
motions.
Definition 2. An NE-solution (UP , V P ) which is Pareto
non-improvable with respect to the values I1, I2 (3) is
called a P (NE)-solution.
2.5 Auxiliary antagonistic positional differential games Γ1
and Γ2.
Dynamics of both games is described by the equation (1).
In the game Γi Player i maximizes the payoff functional
σi(x(ϑ)) (3) and Player 3− i opposes him. It follows from
Krasovskii [1985], Krasovskii and Subbotin [1988] that
both games Γ1 and Γ2 have universal saddle points
{u(i)(t, x, ε), v(i)(t, x, ε)}, i = 1, 2 (5)
and continuous value functions
γ1(t, x), γ2(t, x) (6)
The property of strategies (5) to be universal means that
they are optimal not only for the fixed initial position
(t0, x0) ∈ G but also for any position (t∗, x∗) ∈ G assumed
as initial one.
It is not difficult to see that the value of γi(t, x) is the
guaranteed payoff of the Player i in the position (t, x) of
the game.
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2.6 The structure of NE- and P (NE) -solutions in NPDG
In Kleimenov [1993] the following structure of NE- and
P (NE) -solutions was established. Namely, it was shown
that all NE- and P (NE) -solutions of the game NPDG
can be found in the class of pairs of strategies (U, V ) each
of which generates a unique limit motion (trajectory). The
decision strategies that make up such a pair generating the
trajectory x∗(·) have the form
U0 = {u0(t, x, ε), β01(ε)}, V 0 = {v0(t, x, ε), β02(ε)}, (7)
u0 (t, x, ε) =
{
u∗ (t, ε) , ‖x− x∗(t)‖ < εϕ (t)
u(2)(t, x, ε), ‖x− x∗(t)‖ ≥ εϕ (t) ,
v0 (t, x, ε) =
{
v∗ (t, ε) , ‖x− x∗(t)‖ < εϕ (t)
v(1)(t, x, ε), ‖x− x∗(t)‖ ≥ εϕ (t) ,
for all t ∈ [t0, ϑ], ε > 0. In (7) we denote by u∗(t, ε), v∗(t, ε)
families of program controls generating the limit motion
x∗(t). The function ϕ(·) and the functions β01(·) and β02(·)
are chosen in such a way that the approximated motions
generated by the pair (U0, V 0) from the initial position
(t0, x0) do not go beyond the εϕ(t) -neighborhood of the
trajectory x∗(t). Functions u(2)(·, ·, ·) and v(1)(·, ·, ·) are
defined in (5).
Further, for each NE- and P (NE) - trajectories x∗(t) the
following property holds.
Property 1. The point t = ϑ is the maximum point of the
value function γi(t, x) (6) computed along this trajectory,
that is,
γi(t, x
∗(t)) ≤ γi(ϑ, x∗(ϑ)), t0 ≤ t ≤ ϑ, i = 1, 2 (8)
3. A NON-ANTAGONISTIC POSITIONAL
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH BEHAVIOR TYPES.
3.1 Behavior Types for Players
Now we assume that in addition to the usual normal (nor)
type of behavior aimed at maximizing own functionals
(3), players can use other types of behavior, namely,
altruistic, aggressive and paradoxical types Kleimenov
[1997], Kleimenov and Kryazhimskii [1998].
These three types of behavior can be formalized as follows:
Definition 3. We say that Player 1 is confined in the current
position of the game by altruistic (alt) type of behavior if
his actions in this position are directed exclusively towards
maximizing the functional I2 (3) of Player 2.
Definition 4. We say that Player 1 is confined in the current
position of the game by aggressive (agg) type of behavior if
his actions in this position are directed exclusively towards
minimizing the functional I2 (3) of Player 2.
Definition 5. We will say that Player 1 is confined in the
current position of the game by paradoxical (par) type
of behavior if his actions in this position are directed
exclusively towards minimizing own payoff I1 (3).
Similarly, we define the altruistic and aggressive types
of Player 2 behavior towards Player 1, as well as the
paradoxical type of behavior for Player 2.
Note that the aggressive type of player behavior is actually
used in NPDG in the form of punishment strategies
contained in the structure of the game’s decisions (see, for
example, Kleimenov [1993], Kononenko [1976], Tolwinski
et al [1986]).
The above definitions characterize the extreme types of
behavior of players. In reality, however, real individuals
behave, as a rule, partly normal, partly altruistic, partly
aggressive and partly paradoxical. In other words, mixed
types of behavior seem to be more consistent with reality.
If each player is confined to ”pure” types of behavior, then
in the considered game of two persons with dynamics (1)
and functionals Ii (3) there are 16 possible pairs of types
of behavior: (nor, nor), (nor, alt), (nor, agg), (nor, par),
(alt, nor), (alt, alt), (alt, agg), (alt, par), (agg, nor),
(agg, alt), (agg, agg), (agg, par), (par, nor), (par, alt),
(par, agg), (par, par). For the following four pairs (nor, alt),
(alt, nor), (agg, par) and (par, agg) the interests of the
players coincide and they solve a team problem of con-
trol. For the following four pairs (nor, agg), (alt, par),
(agg, nor) and (par, alt) players have opposite interests
and, therefore, they play an antagonistic differential game.
The remaining 8 pairs define a non-antagonistic differential
games.
The idea of using the players to switch their behavior from
one type to another in the course of the game was applied
to the game with cooperative dynamics in Kleimenov and
Kryazhimskii [1998] and for the repeated bimatrix 2 × 2
game in Kleimenov [1999], which allowed to obtain new
solutions in these games.
The extension of this approach to non-antagonistic posi-
tional differential games leads to new formulation of pro-
blems. In particular, it is of interest to see how the player’s
winnings, obtained on Nash solutions, are transformed.
The actual task is to minimize the time of ”abnormal”
behavior, provided that the players’ payoffs are greater
than when the players behave normally.
Thus, we assume that players can switch from one type of
behavior to another in the course of the game. Such a game
will be called a non-antagonistic positional differential
game with behavior types (NPDGwBT).
3.2 BT -solution in NPDGwBT.
In NPDGwBT we assume that simultaneously with the
choice of positional strategy, each player also chooses
his indicator function defined on the interval t ∈ [t0, ϑ]
and taking the value in the set {nor, alt, agg, par}. We
denote the indicator function of Player i by the symbol
αi : [t0, ϑ] −→ {nor, alt, agg, par}, i = 1, 2. If the indicator
function of some player takes a value, say, alt on some time
interval, then this player acts on this interval as an altruist
in relation to his partner. Note also that if the indicator
functions of both players are identically equal to the value
nor on the whole time interval of the game, then we have
a classical NPDG.
Thus, in the game NPDGwBT Player 1 controls the choice
of a pair of actions {position strategy, indicator function}
(U, α1(·)), and Player 2 controls the choice of a pair of
actions (V, α2(·)).
As mentioned above, for any pair of types of behavior
three types of decision making problems can arise: a team
problem, an antagonistic game, and a non-antagonistic
game. We will assume that the players for each of these
three problems are guided by the following Rules 1-2.
Rule 1. If on the time interval (τ1, τ2) ⊂ [t0, ϑ] the
player’s indicator functions generate a non-antagonistic
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used in NPDG in the form of punishment strategies
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to the game with cooperative dynamics in Kleimenov and
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a classical NPDG.
Thus, in the game NPDGwBT Player 1 controls the choice
of a pair of actions {position strategy, indicator function}
(U, α1(·)), and Player 2 controls the choice of a pair of
actions (V, α2(·)).
As mentioned above, for any pair of types of behavior
three types of decision making problems can arise: a team
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game. We will assume that the players for each of these
three problems are guided by the following Rules 1-2.
Rule 1. If on the time interval (τ1, τ2) ⊂ [t0, ϑ] the
player’s indicator functions generate a non-antagonistic
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game, then on this interval P1 and P2 choose one of
P (NE)- solutions of this game. If an antagonistic game is
realized, then as a solution, P1 and P2 choose the saddle
point of this game. Finally, if a team problem of control is
realized, then P1 and P2 choose one of the pairs of controls
such that the value function γi(t, x) calculated along the
generated trajectory is non-decreasing function, where i is
the number of the player whose functional is maximized
in team problem.
Generally speaking, the same part of the trajectory can be
tracked by several pairs of players’ types of behavior, and
these pairs may differ from each other by the time of use
of abnormal types. It is natural to introduce the following
Rule 2.
Rule 2. If there are several pairs of types of behavior that
track a certain part of the trajectory, then players choose
one of them that minimizes the time of using abnormal
types of behavior.
We now introduce the definition of the solution of the
game NPDGwBT. Note that the set of motions generated
by a pair of actions {(U, α1(·)), (V, α2(·))} coincides with
the set of motions generated by the pair (U, V ) in the
corresponding NPDG.
Definition 6. The pair {(U0, α01(·)), (V 0, α02(·))}, consistent
with Rule 1, forms a BT -solution of the game NPDGwBT
if there exists a trajectory xBT (·) generated by this pair
and there is a P (NE)-solution in the corresponding game
NPDG generating the trajectory xP (·) such that the
following inequalities are true
σi(x
BT (ϑ)) ≥ σi(xP (ϑ)), i = 1, 2, (9)
where at least one of the inequalities is strict.
Definition 7. The BT -solution {(U0, α01(·)), (V 0, α02(·))},
which is Pareto non-improvable with respect to the values
I1, I2 (3), is called P (BT )-solution of the game NPDG-
wBT.
Problem 1. Find the set of BT -solutions.
Problem 2. Find the set of P (BT )-solutions.
In the general case, Problems 1 and 2 have no solutions.
However, it is quite expected that the use of abnormal
behavior types by players in the game NPDGwBT can in
some cases lead to outcomes more preferable for them than
in the corresponding game NPDG only with a normal type
of behavior. An example of this kind is given in the next
section.
4. EXAMPLE
Let equations of dynamics be as follows
ẋ = u+ v, x, u, v ∈ R2, ‖u‖ ≤ 1, ‖v‖ ≤ 1,
0 ≤ t ≤ ϑ, x(0) = x0, (10)
where x is the phase vector; u and v are controls of P1 and
P2, respectively. Let cost functional of Player i be
Ii = σi(x(ϑ)) = 20− ‖x(ϑ)− a(i)‖, i = 1, 2. (11)
That is, the goal of Player i is to bring vector x(ϑ) as close
as possible to the target point a(i).
Let the following initial conditions and values of parame-
ters be given: ϑ = 5.0, x0 = (0, 0), a
(1) = (11, 9), a(2) =
(−11, 9) (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Attainability set.
The game has the following phase restrictions. The trajec-
tories of the system (10) are forbidden from entering the
interior of the set S, which is obtained by removing from
the quadrilateral Oabc the two-link broken line Oeg. The
set S consists of two parts S1 and S2, that is, S = S1∪S2.
Coordinates of the points defining the phase constraints:
a = (−5.5, 4.5), b = (0, 8), c = (5, 4.1), O = (0, 0), e =
(0, 3.5), g = (−3.96, 5.48). It can be verified that the point
a lies on the interval Oa(1), and the point g lies on the
interval ab. Note also that the point c lies just above the
segment Oa(2).
Attainability set of the system (10) constructed for the
moment ϑ consists of points of the circle of radius 10
located not higher than the three-link segment aOc and
also bounded by two arcs connecting the large circle with
the sides ab and bc of the quadrilateral. And the first
(composite) arc consists of an arc of a circle with center
at point a and radius r1 = |aη| and an arc of a circle with
center at point g and radius r = |gξ1|. The second arc is
an arc of the circle with center at the point c and radius
r2 = |cξ2| (Fig. 1).
Results of approximate calculations: r = 2.0726, r1 =
2.8937, r2 = 3.5335, η = (−3.0587, 6.0536), ξ1 =
(−2.2114, 6.5927), ξ2 = (2.2135, 6.2735). In addition, we
have: |Oa(1)| = |Oa(2)| = 14.2127 and |a(1)b| = |a(2)b| =
11.0454.
In Fig. 1 the dashed lines represent arcs of the circle L with
center at the point b and radius r3 = 3.1673 = 14.2127 −
11.0454. These arcs intersect the sides ab and bc at the
points p1 = (−2.6721, 6.2995) and p2 = (2.4974, 6.0520),
respectively. By construction, the lengths of the two-links
a(1)bp2 and a
(2)bp1 are equal to each other and equal to
the lengths of the segments Oa(1) and Oa(2).
The value functions γ1(t, x) and γ2(t, x), 0 ≤ t ≤ ϑ, x ∈
R2\S (6) of the corresponding auxiliary antagonistic ga-
mes Γ1 and Γ2 in this example will be as follows
γi (t, x) =


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denotes the smallest of the
two distances from the point x to the point a(i), one of
which is calculated when the set S is bypassed clockwise
and the other counterclockwise.
At first we solve the game NPDG (without abnormal
behavior types). One can check that in the game NPDG
the trajectory x(t) ≡ 0, t ∈ [0, 5] (stationary point O)
is a Nash trajectory. Further, the trajectories constructed
along the broken line Oeg, are not Nash ones, since none
of them is satisfied condition (8). This is also confirmed
by the fact that the circle of radius |a(1)g| with the center
at the point a(1) has no points in common with the circle
L (see Fig. 1). Obviously, these are not Nash and all the
trajectories that bypass the set S2 on the right, since a
circle of radius |a(2)c| with the center at the point a(2)
also has no points in common with the circle L. Are
not Nash and all trajectories that bypass the set S1 on
the left. As a result, it turns out that the mentioned
trajectory x(t) ≡ 0, t ∈ [0, 5] is the only Nash trajectory,
and, consequently, the only P (NE)-trajectory; the players’
gains on it are I1 = I2 = 5.7873.
Let us now turn to the game NPDGwBT, in which each
player during certain periods of time may exhibit altruism
and aggression towards another player, and the case of
mutual aggression is allowed.
We consider two variants of the game.
Variant I. We assume that P1 and P2 together with a
normal type of behavior, can exhibit altruism towards
their partner during some time intervals.
Variant II. In addition to the assumption of altruism of the
players, we assume that each player can act aggressively
against another player for some periods of time, and a case
of mutual aggression is allowed.
In the attainability set, we find all the points x for which
inequalities hold
σi(x) ≥ σi(O), i = 1, 2, σ1(x) + σ2(x) > σ1(O) + σ2(O)
(13)
Such points form two sets D1 and D2 (see Fig. 1). The
set D1 is bounded by the segment p1ξ1, and also by the
arcs p1q1 and q1ξ1 of the circles mentioned above. The set
D2 is bounded by the segment p2ξ2, and also by the arcs
ξ2q2 and q2p2 of the circles mentioned. On the arc p1q1,
the non-strict inequality (8) for i = 2 becomes an equality,
and on the arc q2p2, the non-strict inequality (8) becomes
an equality for i = 1. At the remaining points sets D1 and
D2 , the non-strict inequalities (8) for i ∈ {1, 2} are strict.
Now within the framework of variant I we construct a
BT -solution leading to the point ξ2 ∈ D2. Consider
the trajectory Ocξ2; the players’ payoffs on it are I1 =
6.1474, I2 = 10.8002, that is, each player gets payoff
which is greater than on single P (NE) -trajectory. How
follows from the foregoing, the trajectory Ocξ2 is not
Nash one. However, if it is possible to construct indicator
functions-programs of players that provide motion along
this trajectory, then a BT -solution will be constructed.
On the side Oc, we find a point d equidistant from
the point a(1) if we go around the set S clockwise, or
if we go around S counterclockwise. We obtain d =
(3.7271, 3.0562). Further, if we move along the trajectory
Ocξ2 with the maximum velocity for t ∈ [0, 5], then the
time to hit the point d will be t = 2.4100, and for the
point c will be t = 3.2330. It can be verified that if we
move along this trajectory on the time interval [0, 2.4100]
then the function γ1(t, x) (12) decreases monotonically
and the function γ2(t, x) (12) increases monotonically; for
motion on the interval t ∈ [2.4100, 3.2330], both functions
γ1(t, x) and γ2(t, x) increase monotonically; finally, when
driving on the remaining interval t ∈ [3.2330, 5.0], then the
function γ1(t, x) increases monotonically, and the function
γ2(t, x) decreases.
We check that on the segment Od of the trajectory the
pair (alt, nor), which defines a team problem of control,
is the only pair of types of behavior that realizes motion
on this segment in accordance with Rule 1; this is the
maximum shift in the direction of the point a(2) . In the
next segment dc there will already be four pairs of ”candi-
dates” (nor, nor), (alt, nor), (nor, alt) and (alt, alt)), but
according to Rule 2 the last three pairs are discarded; the
remaining pair determines a non-antagonistic game, and
the motion on this segment will be generated by P (NE)
- solution of the game. Finally, for the last segment cξ2,
the only pair of types of behavior, that generates motion
on the segment in accordance with Rule 1, there will be a
pair (nor, alt) that defines a team problem of control; the
motion represents the maximum shift in the direction of
the point ξ2.




1 (t) = {alt, t ∈ [0, 2.4100); nor, t ∈ [2.4100, 5]}, (14)
α
(1)
2 (t) = {nor, t ∈ [0, 3.2330); alt, t ∈ [3.2330, 5]}. (15)
We denote by (U (1), V (1)) the pair of players’ strategies
that generates the limit motion Ocξ2 for t ∈ [0, 5] and is
consistent with the constructed indicator functions. Then
we obtain the following assertion.
Theorem 1. In variant I, the pair of actions {(U (1), α(1)1 (·)),
(V (1), α
(1)
2 (·))} (14),(15) provides the P (BT ) -solution.
We turn to the variant II, in which, in addition to assuming
the altruism of the players, it assumed that players can
use an aggressive type of behavior. We construct a BT -
solution, leading to the point ξ1 ∈ D1.
Let us find the point m equidistant from the point a(1) if
we go around the set S1 clockwise, or if we go around S1
counterclockwise. We also find a point n equidistant from
the point a(2) as if we were go around the set S2 clockwise,
or if we go around S2 counterclockwise. The results of the
calculations: m = (0, 0.7928), n = (−0.2925, 3.6462).
Consider the trajectory Oegξ1; the players’ payoffs on it
are I1 = 10.8840, I2 = 6.5359, that is, the payoffs of both
players on this trajectory are greater than payoffs on the
single P (NE) -trajectory. As follows from the above, the
trajectoryOegξ1 is not Nash one. Therefore, if it is possible
to construct indicator functions-programs of players that
provide motion along this trajectory, then a BT -solution
will be constructed.
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which is greater than on single P (NE) -trajectory. How
follows from the foregoing, the trajectory Ocξ2 is not
Nash one. However, if it is possible to construct indicator
functions-programs of players that provide motion along
this trajectory, then a BT -solution will be constructed.
On the side Oc, we find a point d equidistant from
the point a(1) if we go around the set S clockwise, or
if we go around S counterclockwise. We obtain d =
(3.7271, 3.0562). Further, if we move along the trajectory
Ocξ2 with the maximum velocity for t ∈ [0, 5], then the
time to hit the point d will be t = 2.4100, and for the
point c will be t = 3.2330. It can be verified that if we
move along this trajectory on the time interval [0, 2.4100]
then the function γ1(t, x) (12) decreases monotonically
and the function γ2(t, x) (12) increases monotonically; for
motion on the interval t ∈ [2.4100, 3.2330], both functions
γ1(t, x) and γ2(t, x) increase monotonically; finally, when
driving on the remaining interval t ∈ [3.2330, 5.0], then the
function γ1(t, x) increases monotonically, and the function
γ2(t, x) decreases.
We check that on the segment Od of the trajectory the
pair (alt, nor), which defines a team problem of control,
is the only pair of types of behavior that realizes motion
on this segment in accordance with Rule 1; this is the
maximum shift in the direction of the point a(2) . In the
next segment dc there will already be four pairs of ”candi-
dates” (nor, nor), (alt, nor), (nor, alt) and (alt, alt)), but
according to Rule 2 the last three pairs are discarded; the
remaining pair determines a non-antagonistic game, and
the motion on this segment will be generated by P (NE)
- solution of the game. Finally, for the last segment cξ2,
the only pair of types of behavior, that generates motion
on the segment in accordance with Rule 1, there will be a
pair (nor, alt) that defines a team problem of control; the
motion represents the maximum shift in the direction of
the point ξ2.




1 (t) = {alt, t ∈ [0, 2.4100); nor, t ∈ [2.4100, 5]}, (14)
α
(1)
2 (t) = {nor, t ∈ [0, 3.2330); alt, t ∈ [3.2330, 5]}. (15)
We denote by (U (1), V (1)) the pair of players’ strategies
that generates the limit motion Ocξ2 for t ∈ [0, 5] and is
consistent with the constructed indicator functions. Then
we obtain the following assertion.
Theorem 1. In variant I, the pair of actions {(U (1), α(1)1 (·)),
(V (1), α
(1)
2 (·))} (14),(15) provides the P (BT ) -solution.
We turn to the variant II, in which, in addition to assuming
the altruism of the players, it assumed that players can
use an aggressive type of behavior. We construct a BT -
solution, leading to the point ξ1 ∈ D1.
Let us find the point m equidistant from the point a(1) if
we go around the set S1 clockwise, or if we go around S1
counterclockwise. We also find a point n equidistant from
the point a(2) as if we were go around the set S2 clockwise,
or if we go around S2 counterclockwise. The results of the
calculations: m = (0, 0.7928), n = (−0.2925, 3.6462).
Consider the trajectory Oegξ1; the players’ payoffs on it
are I1 = 10.8840, I2 = 6.5359, that is, the payoffs of both
players on this trajectory are greater than payoffs on the
single P (NE) -trajectory. As follows from the above, the
trajectoryOegξ1 is not Nash one. Therefore, if it is possible
to construct indicator functions-programs of players that
provide motion along this trajectory, then a BT -solution
will be constructed.
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First of all find that if we move along the trajectory Oegξ1
with the maximum velocity for t ∈ [0, 5], the time to hit the
point m will be t = 0.3964, the point n will be t = 1.9135,
and the point g will be t = 3.9620. It is easy to verify
that for such a motion along the trajectory Oegξ1 on the
interval t ∈ [0, 0.3964], both functions γ1(t, x) and γ2(t, x)
(12) decrease monotonically; for motion on the interval
t ∈ [0.3964, 1.9135], the function γ2(t, x) continues to
decrease, and the function γ1(t, x) increases; for motion on
the interval t ∈ [1.9135, 3.9620], both functions increase;
finally, on the remaining interval t ∈ [3.9620, 5], the
function γ2(t, x) continues to increase, and the function
γ1(t, x) decreases.
We check that on the segment Om of the trajectory,
the pair (agg, agg), which determines the non-antagonistic
game, is the only pair of types of behaviors that realizes
motion on the segment in accordance with Rule 1; this is
the motion generated by the P (NE) -solution, the best for
both players.
In the next segment mn, two pairs of types of behaviors
realize motion on the segment according to Rule 1, namely
(nor, alt) and (agg, alt); however, according to Rule 2, only
the pair (nor, alt) remains; it defines a team problem of
control in which the motion represents the maximum shift
in the direction of point n.
There are already four pairs of ”candidates” (nor, nor),
(alt, nor), (nor, alt) and (alt, alt) on the segment ng , but
according to Rule 2 the last three pairs are discarded;
the remaining pair defines a non-antagonistic game and
the motion on this segment is generated by the P (NE)
-solution of the game.
Finally, for the last segment gξ1, the only pair of types
of behaviors is the pair (alt, nor), which defines a team
problem of control; the motion represents the maximum
shift in the direction of the point ξ1.




1 (t) = {agg, t ∈ [0, 0.3964); nor, t ∈ [0.3964, 3.9620); },
α
(2)
1 (t) = {alt, t ∈ [3.9620, 5]}, (16)
α
(2)
2 (t) = {agg, t ∈ [0, 0.3964); alt, t ∈ [0.3964, 1.9135); }.
α
(2)
2 (t) = {nor, t ∈ [1.9135, 5]}. (17)
We denote by (U (2), V (2)) the pair of players’ strategies
that generate the limit motion Oegξ1 for t ∈ [0, 5] and is
consistent with the constructed indicator functions. Then
we obtain the following assertion.
Theorem 2. In variant II, the pair of actions {(U (2), α(2)1 (·)),
(V (2), α
(2)
2 (·))} (16),(17) provides the P (BT ) -solution.
Remark 1. It is obvious that Theorem 1 is also true for
variant II.
Following the scheme of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
(and also taking into account Remark 1), we arrive at the
following Theorems.
Theorem 3. In variant I, the set D2 consists of those and
only those points that are endpoints of the trajectories
generated by the BT -solutions of the game.
Theorem 4. In variant II, the sets D1 and D2 consist
of those and only those points that are the ends of the
trajectories generated by the BT -solutions of the game.
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